Obstruction of Justice or Disobedience to Summons?

One legal term that has been thrust recently into the media vocabulary is “obstruction of justice.” The term came out after the “kidnapping” of Jun Lozada, a witness in the senate investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal, and the subsequent admission by the Philippine National Police that he was in their custody.

Later, after Lozada had given his testimony in the Senate regarding the alleged irregularities in the ZTE deal, Sen. Jamby Madrigal filed an obstruction of justice complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against President Gloria Arroyo, and thirteen (13) other government officials including Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, former socio-economic planning secretary Romulo Neri, former environment secretary Michael Defensor, Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Avelino Razon, and environment Secretary Lito Atienza. The basis of the complaint is the alleged conspiracy of respondent officials to stop Lozada from testifying in the Senate.

Assuming that certain public officials conspired to stop Lozada from testifying, I doubt that obstruction of justice was committed by them. Obstruction of justice is an offense defined under Presidential Decree 1829. It is committed, according to the said PD, by any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.

Based on the wording of PD 1829, I think it is quite clear that obstruction of justice can only be committed in relation to criminal cases and not to other kinds of proceedings. The senate hearing, to which Lozada was prevented from attending, is not a criminal investigation but an investigation in aid of legislation.

Perhaps the offense applicable to the public officials who prevented Lozada from attending the senate hearing is disobedience to summons under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). This provision punishes two classes of persons: (1) the person disobeying without legal cause the summon duly issued to him by the Congress (National Assembly), the Constitutional Commissions and their respective committees, sub-committees and divisions, and (2) any person who shall restrain another from attending as a witness or who shall induce disobedience to a summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official.

The public officials who tried to stop Lozada from testifying in the senate, first by inducing him to go to Hong Kong and second by “kidnapping” him in NAIA, may well fall under the second class of persons punished under Article 150 of the RPC. I realize that obstruction of justice carries a heavier penalty than that of disobedience to summons. Perhaps, the penalty imposed under Article 150 is one area that may be legislated on based on the on-going investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal.